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FOREWORD
Despite changes in the global security environment stemming
from the end of the Cold War, U.S. overseas bases remain vulnerable
to ballistic and cruise missiles. This monograph, by Joel Wuthnow,
explains how technical, strategic, and political factors will pose
complex and discrete concerns, and makes a series of policy
recommendations for how best to diminish the threat.
The monograph is being published under the Strategic Studies
Institute’s External Research Associates Program. We are publishing
it as a contribution to the continuing dialogue on the U.S. military’s
strategy of engagement.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Although the United States will continue to utilize overseas
military bases in the next decade, the acquisition and improvement
of long-range missiles by several potential aggressors will pose new
operational and strategic problems for U.S. forces. Several states will
likely attain a credible capability to threaten U.S. bases within their
respective regions, despite the sophistication of U.S. missile defenses.
Strategically, there are uncertainties about whether the United States
can deter some of these new missile-capable actors. Deterrence
problems will create new risks to U.S. deployed forces: If deterrence
fails, U.S. troops will be at a higher level of exposure. Alternately,
missiles will grant states some leverage to dissuade the United States
from actually using overseas forces, as well as a means to coerce host
states into denying access to the United States. Though several factors
will mitigate these concerns, the question remains: How reliable will
alliance-derived “tripwires” and other deployments be in the overall
U.S. strategy of engagement? Alterations in force structure, tailored
to these threats, will likely be needed.
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THE IMPACT OF MISSILE THREATS
ON THE RELIABILITY OF U.S. OVERSEAS BASES:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. national security strategy requires access to overseas military
bases, but in the coming decade, that access will be threatened both
politically and militarily. U.S. strategy demands continued reliance on
bases for two basic reasons. First, in peacetime, U.S. forces stationed
overseas provide evidence of a commitment to defending U.S. and
allied interests. The 2004 NationalMilitary Strategy explained:
Overseas, U.S. forces permanently based in strategically important areas,
rotationally deployed forward in support of regional objectives, and
temporarily deployed during contingencies convey a credible message
that the United States remains committed to preventing conﬂict. These
forces also clearly demonstrate that the United States will react forcefully
should an adversary threaten the United States, its interests, allies, and
partners.1

Despite signiﬁcant base closures, particularly in Western Europe
and with more on the horizon (particularly in Germany and South
Korea), the United States continues to operate 35 large or mediumsized installations abroad.2 These include air bases, naval facilities,
and U.S. Army barracks. These facilities are mostly located in allied
territory, speciﬁcally North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Europe, Turkey, Japan, and Korea.
Second, in times of conﬂict, overseas bases provide operational
beneﬁts for U.S. combat forces. With the exception of a limited
number of long-range bombers and certain naval vessels, the United
States cannot project combat power without access to bases in the
area of operations. Ground forces require supply centers and seaor airports through which to deploy, except in instances in which
long-range forced entry operations may be effectively conducted.
Most ships require repair and maintenance facilities, though not
exclusively outside the continental United States. Likewise, most
low-quantity, high-value aircraft (e.g., stealth ﬁghters and airborne
1

warning and control systems [AWACS] early warning aircraft)
require theater land basing. In some circumstances, combat forces
may be generated and sustained from bases in allied territory,
while in others (e.g., a conﬂict in the Middle East or Central Asia),
temporary access agreements will have to be negotiated.
With the exception of Guam, all U.S. overseas bases are located on
foreign soil, and all temporarily used bases will be located in foreign
countries. Hence, both types of bases are subject to the willingness of
foreign governments to grant access to the United States. Regarding
permanent bases, states may request a withdrawal of U.S. forces. For
instance, in 1991 nationalist opposition in the Philippines led to the
end of a century-long U.S. military presence there. More commonly,
states may disallow U.S. use of facilities for particular operations. In
2003, for example, Turkey refused to permit U.S. forces to use the
NATO air base at Incirlik in support of the war on Iraq. Regarding
temporary access, states may simply refuse to permit U.S. entry,
or may strictly delineate the acceptable uses of their facilities. For
instance, most Persian Gulf states denied the U.S. access during
strikes on Iraq in 1998.
External military threats compose a second broad category of
vulnerabilities to U.S. overseas bases. As early as the 1960s, all U.S.
bases were within reach of Soviet ballistic missiles; the threat of a
Soviet invasion was also a perennial concern during the Cold War.
Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) identiﬁes three “levels”
of military threats against its overseas installations. Level I includes
terrorism, sabotage, and civil unrest; Level II includes guerilla and
special operations attacks; and Level III includes conventional
attack and missile strikes, including missiles tipped with nuclear,
chemical, or biological warheads.3 Moreover, military threats are
linked to political vulnerability. As the National Defense Panel has
noted, “For political reasons, allies might be coerced not to grant the
United States access to their sovereign territory. Hostile forces might
threaten punitive strikes against nations considering an alliance or
coalition with the United States.”4
Thus, an overall assessment of the reliability of overseas basing
must take into account both political and military factors. This is a
difﬁcult task, because it demands an analysis of the domestic politics
of every state in which the United States currently possesses bases or
2

is likely to desire to deploy troops. As suggested, decisions to deny
access can result from circumstances particular to individual states
or regions. An overall assessment also demands a review of each
type of military threat listed above, including both the capabilities
of all possible enemies and the resolve of those states actually to use
force. As indicated by the current war on terrorism, the motives and
resources of nonstate organizations must also be factored into any
general risk analysis. Finally, analysts must attempt to understand
the relationship between external threats and the domestic politics
of host nations.
This monograph does not seek to make an overall assessment of
reliability, but focuses on the “Level III” problem of missile threats.
Three factors suggest that the threat will be at least as signiﬁcant in
the coming decade as it was during the Cold War. First, several new
actors are developing the means to target effectively and destroy
ﬁxed land locations―those states may lack the aggregate ﬁrepower
of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), but may
still develop missiles and missile warheads of sufﬁcient caliber to
threaten the United States at a regional level. Second, new missilecapable states may not exercise restraint in using missiles, as it
was believed the Soviet Union did. The answer to the question of
whether certain states, especially those labeled “rogue states,” can
be deterred is not clearly “yes.” Third, missiles will provide old and
newly capable states a uniquely powerful instrument to coerce host
nations into denying access to the United States. This is a particular
concern in the post-Cold War period because the United States will
likely wish to operate in theaters such as the Middle East and Central
Asia, in which it lacks formal allies and in which new missile states
are appearing.
Nevertheless, emerging missile threats do not obviously spell
an end of the reliability of overseas bases. Some factors may,
indeed, work in the opposite direction. First, the United States has
a lead in military technology which may be leveraged to provide
for defense against missile attack; defensive capabilities may be
especially effective against states on the lower end of the capabilities
spectrum. Second, deterrence is not necessarily implausible. All state
decisionmakers are interested in their own survival, and so must
consider the possibility that any use of missiles will compromise the
3

survival of their regime. Third, missile threats may actually make
current and potential host nations more accepting of U.S. military
presence; in the absence of sustained military cooperation with the
United States, those same states may only be more vulnerable to
increasing external threats.5
Some U.S. government reports in the past few years have begun
to recognize the signiﬁcance of missile threats on basing reliability.
In 1997, the National Defense Panel wrote that, based on this threat,
“the days of the 6-month build-up and secure, large, rear-area bases
are almost certainly gone forever.”6 In 2001, the DoD’s Quadrennial
Defense Review noted that “Saturation attacks with ballistic and cruise
missiles could deny or delay U.S. access to overseas bases, airﬁelds,
and ports.”7 The few papers offering more detailed analysis of the
problem have been, on the whole, technically-oriented. Meanwhile,
sources that consider the higher-level subjects of coercion diplomacy
and political decisionmaking have not dealt with the possible
consequences for overseas basing.8
Thus, this monograph assesses the countervailing factors that
will determine the impact of missile threats on basing reliability in
the next decade. I will address this problem at three levels. Section II
considers the balance of capabilities, covering the strategic reasons
and proliferation environment that are driving states to acquire
missiles, the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the offensive
threat, and defenses available to the United States. Section III assesses
the missile threat at the strategic level. The analysis attempts to
estimate the effectiveness of deterrence as a strategy through which
the United States will seek to prevent attacks on its overseas bases.
Section IV analyzes the threat at a political level. The idea is that
missiles may be used to coerce U.S. leaders to withdraw or fail to use
overseas forces, or to coerce host nations into denying access to the
United States. Section V draws these analyses together and concludes
that missile threats will pose new and complex risks to overseas
basing reliability at all three levels, but the impact is complicated
by disparities and uncertainties. The remainder of the conclusion
describes ﬁve methods of reducing the risk.
The anticipated contribution of this assessment is twofold: ﬁrst,
as a broad and comprehensive study of how missile threats will
impact basing reliability. Given the state of the current literature,
4

the concept of exploring this issue at three separate, but interlinked,
levels represents a unique offering. Second, the assessment serves
as a model for how to think about the impact of external military
threats on U.S. force structure. To the extent that the assessment does
not, and cannot, provide sufﬁcient consideration of particular topics,
the organization of the document is ﬂexible so as to allow for the
incorporation of additional information. While the conclusion may
change according to those inputs, the way of reaching that conclusion
remains constant.
SECTION II. THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE
Foreign militaries are developing missile systems as a relatively
inexpensive way to defeat U.S. forces before they are employed
in combat. Indeed, for most states, a doctrine of challenging the
United States with conventional arms, such as ﬁghter jets, tanks, and
aircraft carriers, will be untenable for the foreseeable future.9 The
only possible exceptions will be China and Russia, but China will
remain at least a generation behind the state of the technological art
and will lack the capability to sustain forces far from its borders.10
The Russian military has suffered a signiﬁcant decline since the mid1980s, and a massive spending increase would be needed to restore
conventional parity between Russia and an expanded NATO.11
Therefore, the United States will probably not face a peer military
competitor within the next 15 years.
Given this gap between “the West and the rest,” potential
adversaries must focus on exploiting areas of relative U.S.
vulnerability. Such asymmetric strategies may include political
warfare aimed at swaying world opinion against the United States;
nontraditional modes of ﬁghting, including urban and guerilla
warfare, in which U.S. technological advantages are limited; targeting
critical systems, such as computer and communications networks,
that enable U.S. forces to “see” and “listen”;12 developing surfaceto-air missiles and mines that deny U.S. forces the ability to enter
a combat zone; or targeting sites in the rear area―logistics points,
airbases, naval facilities, and headquarters―which are vital both to
generate combat forces and to sustain troops on the front lines.13
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The strategy of targeting U.S. overseas bases is particularly
appropriate to states seeking to match their strength with U.S.
weakness. Indian Brigadier General Vijai Nair has studied the 199091 Gulf War, in which the United States exhibited reliance on a
network of bases across the Persian Gulf. Thus, he observes,
When conducting offensive operations, modern armed forces are most
vulnerable when they are mobilizing, moving to their forward assembly
areas, beyond the reach of their logistics tail, and while they are regrouping to continue the offensive. With a limited effort at the right place
and time, he can inﬂict disproportionate damage to the attackers design of
battle and force cohesion.14

With speciﬁc reference to the United States, Nair goes on to
suggest that developing militaries ﬁnd ways to inﬂict damage on the
U.S. rear area. As he argues,
Management of host country facilities is, by far, the trickiest part of the
American operational problem. This is the proverbial “Achilles heel.”
India needs to study the vulnerabilities and create covert and overt bodies
to develop plans and execute operations to degrade these facilities in the
run up to and after commencement of hostilities. Scope exists for low cost
options to signiﬁcantly reduce the combat potential of forces operating
from these facilities.15

As another example of this mode of thinking, Russian Defense
Minister Igor Sergeyev has written that the Russian armed forces
should selectively attack “the most vulnerable functional elements
of the main systems and key targets of the enemy’s infrastructure,
and in this way signiﬁcantly [devalue] their superiority.”16
Acquisition of ballistic and cruise missiles is a means by which
states can pursue this asymmetric strategy.17 The basic reason is that
both of these weapons can deliver a payload of either conventional
munitions or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to locations of
strategic signiﬁcance behind the opposing force’s front lines. Ballistic
missiles can deliver a warhead to a ﬁxed point at a distance ranging
from a few hundred to several thousand kilometers, depending on
design and payload.18 The precise amount of damage any one ballistic
missile is capable of inﬂicting on a land location is subject to several
factors, such as accuracy, the type of warhead, and ability to survive
6

defenses. As an example of the possible effects, however, RAND
has estimated that a single ballistic missile carrying an 1,100-pound
bomb could have a “lethal area” of 825 by 1,250 feet―wide enough
to encompass an entire air wing (96 F-15-sized aircraft) parked in the
open.19
According to one senior U.S. Air Force general, this capability
could ﬁx high costs on future U.S. military interventions. Former
U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Ronald Fogleman has said,
Saturation ballistic missile attacks against littoral forces, ports, storage
facilities, and staging areas could make it extremely costly to project U.S.
forces into a disputed theater, much less carry out operations to defeat a
well-armed aggressor. Simply the threat of such enemy missile attacks
might deter U.S. and coalition partners from responding to aggression in
the ﬁrst instance.20

Despite the possible damage to ﬁxed land locations, ballistic
missile systems have several drawbacks for a developing military.
First, an international agreement known as the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) limits the proliferation of the complex
technological items necessary to construct a ballistic missile.
However, as discussed in more detail below, several missile-capable
states, such as North Korea and Iran, are not members of the MTCR.
Second, domestic development programs can be difﬁcult because
of the cost, technological complexity, and ability of U.S. intelligence
to monitor missile testing.21 Third, ballistic missiles can pose certain
operational problems―their considerable weight requires a large
and vulnerable launch platform, such as a truck or a ﬁxed launch
site. Moreover, the ﬂight path of a given missile can be predicted at
launch so as to give the target some degree of warning.22
For these reasons, many states have opted to invest in cruise
missiles. Cruise missiles are low-ﬂying unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) that, when used against land targets, can deliver a warhead to
a typical distance of between 50 and 500 kilometers.23 Procurement of
cruise missiles is manageable because the core components (guidance
systems, propulsion, airframe) involve “dual-use” technologies that
are not prohibited under international agreements.24 Similarly, cruise
missiles are relatively inexpensive. The U.S. Army estimates that for
an investment of $50 million, a Third World country could purchase
7

at least 100 land attack cruise missiles (LACMs, used for reaching
targets on land), but only 15 tactical ballistic missiles.25 To be sure,
several conventionally armed cruise missiles would be needed to
inﬂict the damage of a typical ballistic missile.26 Given the low cost of
procurement, however, this may not be a prohibitive requirement.
In the case of both types of missiles, states pursuing asymmetric
strategies will beneﬁt from a robust proliferation environment―there
is no question that proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles will
continue in the next decade.27 Russia and China are key proliferators
of concern.28 Other missile-capable states, such as Iran, North Korea,
and Syria, may engage in “secondary proliferation” of items that
were themselves imported.29 Transfers from any of these states would
allow a third country to accelerate a domestic production program.30
In addition, the number of producers of LACMs will likely increase
from 2 to 9 in the next decade, and 22 states have the technologies
necessary for a domestic manufacturing capacity of cruise missiles
of all types.31 Technical expertise and material needed to construct
missiles also are widely available on the world market.
The primary international agreement aimed at curbing missile
proliferation is the MTCR. Established in 1987, the MTCR contains
two categories of proscribed items. Category I bans the sale of
complete missile systems that are capable of delivering 500-kilogram
payloads to a range of over 300 kilometers. Category II includes
a variety of subsystems and enhancements for missile systems,
such as avionics, navigation equipment, and stealth technology.32
Twenty-ﬁve nations are signatories to the MTCR, although most are
U.S. allies in NATO Europe and East Asia.33 Missile systems with
ranges below 300 kilometers and payloads below 500 kilograms
are subject to the Wassenaar Agreement.34 In operation since 1996,
Wassenaar aims to reduce the prevalence of dual-use technologies
that can be incorporated in cruise missiles, such as advanced
materials, navigation systems, sensors, and certain electronics. As
with the MTCR, with the exception of Russia and a few other states,
the signatories of Wassenaar are mostly U.S. allies.
Both regimes suffer from similar weaknesses. Several producers
of missile technology have not pledged to abide by either agreement:
of the current manufacturers of cruise missiles, only half are
members of Wassenaar,35 and only one of the other half (South
8

Africa) has joined the MTCR. Likewise, some signatories have
bent the rules in the pursuit of proﬁt. Though China promised to
abide by the MTCR’s Category I provisions, Chinese ﬁrms have
transferred dual-use technology to a number of states (including
Iran, North Korea, and Libya), and assisted Pakistan in its attempt
to develop a medium-range ballistic missile.36 The agreements also
do not prevent the proliferation of technical experts, which applies
to scientists from Russia, China, India, and elsewhere.37 To be sure,
some steps can be taken to retard the spread of missile systems and
related technology.38 However, these steps will not eliminate the
objective of states to develop the capabilities to challenge U.S. forces
militarily, nor will it eliminate the leverage accrued by the suppliers
of such technology.39 As a result, acquisition of missiles and related
technology will continue.
In short, ballistic and cruise missiles will provide foreign militaries
the capability to credibly threaten U.S. forces in their staging areas.
Proliferation of such weapons is a particularly acute concern in light
of U.S. deployments to bases in Central Asia following the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, and as U.S. forces
deployed to bases in the Persian Gulf in preparation for the war
against Iraq in the winter of 2002-03.40 Nevertheless, the character
of the threat will be regulated by several factors: the number of
missiles and missile-capable states; the quality of those arsenals; and
the extent to which the United States can provide adequate theater
defenses.
Quantitative Determinants.
Due primarily to strategic arms reduction, treaties, and the
retirement of Cold War-era weapons, the aggregate number of
ballistic missiles has been declining since the mid-1980s and will likely
continue to fall.41 Likewise, the total number of states that possess
ballistic missiles is not likely to increase substantially―it may, in fact,
decline.42 Of the 35 states currently possessing some type of ballistic
missile, the vast majority only possess small numbers (under 50) of
Soviet-derived surface-to-surface missile systems (SCUDs), which
typically lack both the range and accuracy to pose a serious threat
to U.S. bases.43 Moreover, as these SCUD weapons age, some poor
missile-capable states may not be able to maintain their arsenals.
9

However, these indicators obscure speciﬁc changes in some
inventories that pose new or evolving concerns for the United States.
That is, certain hostile countries may establish a capability to target
U.S. forces, or increase their ability to do so. The range necessary
for an offensive actor to target any given U.S. facility is dictated by
circumstance. For most potential aggressors, a short-range ballistic
missile (SRBM, range <1,000 km) would be insufﬁcient to target any
U.S. land base. But there are exceptions. With 300-km range SCUD-B
weapons, Syria can target the U.S. air base at Incirlik, Turkey, and
North Korea can target U.S. Army garrisons and air bases in the
northern part of South Korea. With 550-km range SCUD-C weapons,
Iran can target U.S. locations on the east coast of the Arabian
Peninsula, Syria can reach most of southeastern Turkey, and North
Korea can target the entire South. In addition, Syria is developing a
750-km range SCUD-D weapon that would allow it to hit targets in
northern Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the southern Caucasus.
More complex is the problem of speciﬁc increases in the
number of longer-range missiles and inventories. Due to the 1987
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, medium- and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs, ranges of
1,000-3,000 and 3,000-5,500 km, respectively) were eliminated from
U.S. and Soviet arsenals, leading to a 97 percent reduction of IRBMs
and a 36-58 percent reduction of MRBMs. However, several other
potentially hostile countries now possess MRBM-range weapons or
are developing such a capability:
• North Korea possesses an unknown number of No Dong-1
missiles (1,300-km) and is in the process of developing the No
Dong-2 (1,500-km) and Taepo Dong-1 (2,000-km) MRBMs, and
Taepo Dong-2 (5,000-6,000-km) IRBM.
• China has built about 50 CSS-5 (1,800 km) MRBMs and a
similar number of CSS-2 (3,000-4,000-km) IRBMs.
• In South Asia, India has produced about 20 2,500-km range
Agni-2 MRBMs, and Pakistan has countered with the 1,500-km
range Ghauri-1 MRBM (a derivative of the No Dong-1). India
is developing the Agni-3 (3,000-km) IRBM, while Pakistan is
working on the Shaheen-2 (2,500-km) and Ghauri-2 (2,300-km)
MRBMs and has engine tested a Ghauri-3 (3,000-km) IRBM.
10

• In the Middle East, Iran has tested the Shahab-3 (1,300-km),
and is developing the Shahab-4 (2,000 km) MRBMs.
• Iraq, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was
likely to ﬂight test an MRBM by the year 2010 (prior to the
2003 war).44
• Syria is not projected to attain a domestic production capacity,
but may attempt to purchase mid-range ballistic missiles on
the world market.
• In December 2003, Libya promised to ban ballistic missiles
with ranges over 300 km (thus keeping its SCUD-B arsenal
intact), but concerns remain about noncompliance and
recidivism.45
The CIA is agnostic on the precise number of missiles that will
be ﬁelded, but (excluding China and North Korea) one independent
analyst has suggested that the other states may be able to launch
between 1-5 MRBMs within 5 years.46
Mid-range ballistic missile development and proliferation would
endanger U.S. forces operating on three continents:
• North Korea’s No Dong-1 MRBM is capable of hitting U.S.
forces in South Korea and all of Japan except for those Marines
stationed on Okinawa, while its Taepo Dong missiles would be
able to reach the U.S. base on Guam, as well as forces south to
Australia.
• China’s CSS-5s could reach U.S. targets in South Korea, Japan,
eastern Central Asia, and, in the case of its CSS-2 IRBMs,
Guam, the Caspian Basin, and even the eastern edge of the
Arabian Peninsula.
• India’s 2,500-km range Agni-II can target the strategic U.S.
naval base on Diego Garcia, as well as the eastern Arabian
Peninsula and much of Central Asia. Pakistan’s 1,500-km
range Ghauri-1 can also threaten U.S. forces in the Persian
Gulf and Central Asia.47
• Iran’s Shahab-4 MRBM could reach U.S. bases in Oman, Qatar,
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. An Iraqi MRBM, depending on
speciﬁcations, would have placed many or all of the U.S.
11

bases and staging points in the Persian Gulf within striking
distance.
• From Libya, a No Dong-range weapon could reach eastern
Turkey (including Incirlik Air Base), most of the Mediterranean,
and U.S. naval facilities in southern Italy. From Syria, such a
missile could hit U.S. forces in Turkey, the Caucasus, Kuwait,
Bahrain, and most of Saudi Arabia.
Intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs, range >5,500
km) will continue to pose dangers to U.S. locations on a global scale.
To be sure, the total number of ICBMs in the world has shrunk by 47
percent since 1987 (2,131 versus 4,040). On account of strategic arms
reduction treaties, the number of missiles and warheads will likely
continue to drop in the next decade. Barring a major increase in
defense spending, Russia’s number of ICBM warheads is projected
to drop below 2,000 by 2015, but will still be large enough to credibly
threaten virtually any U.S. land location. China possesses a small
deterrent force of CSS-3 and CSS-4 ICBMs, and will produce more
sophisticated models by the end of the decade. Elsewhere, at least
three states (India, Iran, and North Korea) are in various stages of
developing ICBMs. However, in terms of the direct impact on U.S.
bases, the ICBM threat is less signiﬁcant than the mid-range threat,
since ICBMs are designed to threaten the U.S. homeland, and not
overseas military sites.48
Cruise missiles involve at least as many complexities as ballistic
missiles. Currently about 75,000 cruise missiles are in existence,
though the vast majority of these are anti-ship cruise missiles
(ASCMs). A state would require a more complex LACM to consider
striking at a U.S. land base. Currently, Russia holds a large number
of Cold War-era LACMs (including 1,293 declared AS-15 LACMs);
China holds an unknown number of domestically produced HN-1
and HN-2 LACMs; India produces the Lakshya missile. However, the
CIA projects that, by 2015 as many as 24 states will attain a LACM
capability. Though the CIA does not specify which states, we can
assume that states such as Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and
Syria could acquire these weapons. The reason is that multiple
acquisition pathways are available: indigenous development; the
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conversion of ASCMs to land-attack versions; and purchase of
LACMs or related technologies on the world market.49 Again, the
CIA does not attempt to predict the precise number of cruise missiles,
but, given the missiles’ relatively low cost, an average consumer may
be able to acquire several hundred units of varying quality.
LACM proliferation would have strategic consequences for U.S.
bases in each of the theaters in which they operate. The most common
variety of LACMs50 will have ranges of several hundred kilometers,
thus endangering forward operation locations (see discussion of
SRBMs).51 Another challenge is that, in contrast to ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles can be effectively launched from ships. Michael E.
Dickey of the U.S. Air War College has hypothesized scenarios
in which states may use forward-launched LACMs against U.S.
locations. In one case, an asserting state contracts three or four
merchant freighter ships to sail to a point in international waters
from which locations at a range of several hundred kilometers could
be targeted. The added beneﬁt is that, in such a scheme, the attacking
state may be difﬁcult to identify.52 In this manner, U.S. facilities in
littoral regions such as the Persian Gulf, Northeast Asia, Turkey, and
southern Europe may be targeted by LACM-capable states. Inland
locations, such as Central Asia or Northern Europe, however, would
be safe from short-range forward-launched LACMs.
The problem of proliferation is summarized in Table 1.
Developing =

Current =
ICBM

SRBM

MRBM
IRBM

IRBM

SLBM

China
DPRK53
India
Pakistan
Iran
Iraq54
Syria
Libya55
Russia

LACM

Principal sources: Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile
Threat Through 2015, Unclassiﬁed
Summary of a National Intelligence
Estimate, December 2001; Report of
the Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States
(Rumsfeld Commission), Executive
Summary, July 1998; Ballistic and Cruise
Missile Threat, National Air Intelligence
Center, NAIC-1031-0985-98; Unclassiﬁed
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Conventional Munitions,
CIA report, 2003.

Table 1. Current/Developing or Potential Acquisition, through 2010.
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Qualitative Determinants.
The problem of growing missile inventories is compounded by
the prospect that users of those weapons will be able to effectively
locate, target, and destroy U.S. sites of military signiﬁcance.56 Both
types of enhancement will affect those states’ battleﬁeld capability,
as well as their ability to engage in coercive diplomacy with the
United States or its partners, as will be further discussed below.
The problem of location will be aided by a rising availability
of high-resolution commercial satellite imagery. High-resolution
imaging would provide a state the capability to pinpoint the
coordinates of bases and other troop deployments. Currently, only the
U.S. ﬁrm, Space Imaging, Inc., which operates the IKONOS satellite,
offers high resolution products to private buyers, but companies in
France, Israel, India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and elsewhere will
enter the market in future years.57 Whereas, during the 2001 conﬂict
in Afghanistan, DoD was able to purchase IKONOS images of U.S.
troop deployments, and thus deny this intelligence to other parties,
such an option may not obtain in the future if high-resolution imagery
becomes available on the global market, as appears likely.
Precise coordinates are of little use without the ability to accurately
hit that exact latitude and longitude. At present, most missile-capable
states that are not U.S. allies possess highly inaccurate derivatives of
Soviet ballistic missiles.58 Lacking the ability to make en-route course
corrections, simple ballistic missiles can drift several kilometers from
the intended target.59 Stanford’s Itzhak Ravid estimates the Circular
Error Probable (CEP) values for several types of ballistic missiles as
such: 2 kilometers for a SCUD-B, 5 km for a SCUD-C, and 10 km for
a No Dong.60 Of course, such inaccuracy would severely reduce the
efﬁcacy of any enemy missile strike on U.S. bases.
However, advances in guidance technology over the next decade
will allow states to improve ballistic missile accuracy. Large and
wealthy states may be able to develop or purchase guidance systems
that greatly reduce CEP. For instance, China is developing a terminal
guidance system, similar to that employed by the U.S. Pershing-II
missiles, which would enable China’s MRBM force a CEP of roughly
160 feet.61 Lower-end militaries will also proﬁt from advances in
guidance technology, but to a lesser degree. In particular, these
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states may be able to equip their missile forces with commercial
navigation aids such as the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS)
or the equivalent Russian GLONASS system. These systems are
essentially satellite constellations that can vector exact latitude and
longitude values to receivers on the ground. When incorporated into
the crudest ballistic missile, a GPS receiver could improve accuracy
by 20 percent.62 For states such as Iran and North Korea, this gain
may be sufﬁcient to incur a marginal increase in the overall capacity
to damage U.S. bases.
The more worrisome applications of advanced guidance technology may be in LACMs.63 The reason is that, unlike typical ballistic
missiles, cruise missile propulsion allows for course modiﬁcations
from launch to impact. GPS data would allow LACMs to eliminate
any accrued error and, according to one analyst, achieve, “pinpoint
accuracy.”64 Regarding both types of missiles, however, the principal
drawback to reliance on GPS navigation is the potential ability to
block signals in a given geographic area during a crisis situation. In
the future, though, LACM operators may be able to overcome this
challenge by incorporating multiple types of navigation systems.
Accompanied by the basic inertial navigation system and GPS, for
instance, LACMs may be outﬁtted with terrain matching technology
(such as the TERCOM system employed by U.S. Tomahawk cruise
missiles). Russia, China, and other states are currently developing
this technology, although the proliferation consequences are, as yet,
unknown.65
The third qualitative determinant is improvement in the lethality
of ballistic and cruise missile warheads. Warheads can be divided
into two basic types: conventional and unconventional (meaning
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear). Conventional warheads
use chemical explosives such as TNT to cause a “kill mechanism”
to detonate and spew metal fragments over a wide area.66 The key
operational concern is that conventional warheads will be equipped
with “submunitions,” several hundred small bombs that can inﬂict
damage over a wider area than a standard “unitary” warhead.67
This is particularly relevant to bases in which militarily valuable but
“soft-skinned” targets (e.g., vehicles, power systems, personnel) are
dispersed over a wide range.68 Currently, states including China and
Russia already possess this technology, and, within the next decade,
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any other state “powerful enough to contemplate a conventional
military campaign against U.S. interests . . .” will likely be able to
acquire it.69
Some states may also attempt to improve the lethality of their
missiles by using warheads that contain WMD.70 Nuclear-tipped
missiles offer the greatest potential damage, as even a ﬁrst-generation
bomb (of the variety that might be developed in a state such as North
Korea or Iran) could achieve a yield more than a thousand times
greater than a warhead ﬁlled with conventional high explosives.71
Moreover, a nuclear option may be preferable over chemical and
biological weapons because of the certainty that a nuclear weapon
will detonate within a predictable area, and under all meteorological
conditions.72 At present, several potential foes (India, Pakistan,
Russia, China, and North Korea) possess a nuclear capability, and
others could acquire one within the next decade.73
Chemical and biological weapons offer the possibility of largescale damage without the cost, acquisition, or maintenance difﬁculties
associated with nuclear weapons, and are also less difﬁcult to
conceal.74 The amount of damage yielded by a chemical warhead
would depend on weather conditions, amount, type, and the defenses
undertaken by base personnel, though contamination effects may be
present at a distance of more than half a mile from the impact point.75
Biological weapons are subject to similar use restrictions, and the
potential damage may also be limited by preparedness. In addition,
vaccines for some known pathogens (such as anthrax) are available,
even though genetic modiﬁcation tactics may obviate these speciﬁc
immunities.76 Several countries, including China, Russia, North
Korea, Pakistan, India, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Sudan, currently
possess chemical and/or biological weapons, in some cases in great
amounts.77 Moreover, growth in the amount and complexity of these
weapons, especially among poorer states, will proceed in the coming
decade.78
Damage Limitation.
DoD has enumerated four basic methods of limiting the damage of
theater missile attacks: passive defense, active defense, counterattack,
and C4I.79 Passive defense refers to a range of activities designed
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to fortify troops and locations prior to an attack, including the
duplication of certain critical capabilities, development of recovery
and reconstitution plans, dispersal of assets, and hardening vital
areas within a base complex. However, passive defense efforts suffer
the drawbacks of time and cost.80 Time is a concern with respect to
bases leased on a short-term basis or those in regions in which the
United States has not had a long-standing presence. For instance,
certain airports in the former Soviet republics, contracted to support
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001, lacked the required
infrastructure―at some sites, engineers estimated a minimum of 4
months to achieve a minimum standard.81 New or underdeveloped
bases also require a large cost investment. RAND estimates the cost
of constructing one new reinforced hangar sized to ﬁt a single ﬁghter
aircraft at $4 million.82 Older, Cold War-vintage bases may incur
high upgrade costs as they prepare to meet a more complex set of
challenges.83
Active defenses encompass cruise and ballistic missile defense
systems intended to detect, track, and engage inbound enemy
missiles. For several reasons, cruise missiles present particular
problems in the ﬁrst two stages.84 First, since they ﬂy low to the
earth’s surface, cruise missiles are difﬁcult or, under heavy cover,
impossible to detect with currently existing space-based sensors.85
Second, LACMs present a small radar cross section (RCS) which may
be difﬁcult to differentiate from “ground clutter,” such as vehicles.
Third, advanced designs may incorporate “radar absorbing”
materials to further reduce the RCS, as well as countermeasures such
as chaff and decoys.86
In response, DoD is developing several concepts to improve and
integrate sensor capabilities. These include upgrades to existing
systems, such as AWACS and joint surveillance, target attack radar
system (JSTARS) aircraft, which were designed to track thousands
of slow-moving targets;87 the Space-Based Radar, which is being
engineered to “track mobile targets over wide areas at strategic
depths,” but is unlikely to be deployed until after 2010;88 and the
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System (JLENS) program,89 which would provide a 250-kilometerwide detection system, but is also still in the early development
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stage.90 Nevertheless, several analysts suggest that such defenses,
even if they do come on-line, will probably not be able to protect
forward bases from massed attacks.91
Traveling in a high arc, ballistic missiles are easier to track than
cruise missiles, though, because of their velocity, they are relatively
difﬁcult to intercept. The DoD response plan is layered, concentrating
on systems designed to attack incoming missiles in their three
phases of ﬂight: boost phase, mid-course-phase, and terminalphase. Current boost phase programs include the Space-based Laser
and the Airborne Laser.92 The Sea-Based Midcourse Defense is the
prime mid-course element oriented toward ballistic missile threats
to overseas assets.93 The PAC-3 and Theater High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) programs provide terminal-phase protection.
PAC-3 is aimed at short-range weapons,94 while THAAD, deployed
in batteries of 150 missiles, is designed to engage both SRBMs and
MRBMs.95 Despite this layered approach, analysts are decidedly
mixed in estimating how well ballistic missile defense will perform
against incoming missiles.96
In general, active defenses are likely to suffer at least three
drawbacks. First, since cruise and ballistic missiles may be used as
part of a strategic strike against U.S. forces, active defenses must
be on a constant state of alert. Systems designed to defend forward
operating bases and those in littoral areas may be particularly taxed,
since those locations are susceptible to a broader range of offensive
weapons than those situated in the extreme rear area.97 Second is the
concern that enhancements to offensive weapons are easier to effect
than corresponding upgrades in deployed defenses. For instance,
future missile forces may feature chaff or decoy countermeasures,
and may be coated with radar-absorbing materials.98 Third, regardless
of the sophistication of a defense, an adversary armed with a given
“threshold” number of missiles will possess the capability to
overwhelm those defenses―a concern exacerbated by the growing
lethality of individual warheads. Though future active defenses may
not constitute a hapless and misleading “American Maginot Line,”99
the emerging threat will signiﬁcantly “stress air defenses.”100
The third pillar of the DoD response is “counterattack” against
enemy missile infrastructure (launch sites and command-and-control
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facilities) before, during, and after a strike. Two conditions are
necessary for the success of a counterattack strategy. First, following
an initial attack, the United States must retain the required ﬁrepower
to respond at a level that would signiﬁcantly damage or destroy the
enemy’s offensive capabilities. This may not be assumed if the use of
aircraft carriers and long-range bombers were ruled out as alternative
sources of ﬁre, though RAND considers that highly improbable.101
Stealthy long-range bombers may be the most effective option, but,
with only 16 B-2s in service and no follow-ons on the acquisition
agenda, the bomber force may not be strong enough to “kick down
the door.”102
Second, effective counterattack must be able to target the enemy’s
missile systems. This requirement is problematic because states may
conceal or move their forces. For instance, during the Gulf War,
Iraqi SCUD forces “used deception and camouﬂage extensively,
conducted continual exercises to minimize launch preparation
times, [and] developed secure communications.”103 Nevertheless,
the advent of the Space-Based Radar after 2010 may signiﬁcantly
improve U.S. detection capabilities, and long-range UAVs will
provide an advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
platform.104
The ﬁnal component of the DoD response concerns C4I activities.
C4I is not a stand-alone answer to a missile threat, but supports
and ties together the other three parts of the response strategy. In
particular, it is intended to provide information to decisionmakers,
including targeting data, damage assessment, and tactical warning
of an impending attack―what former Admiral William Owens has
labeled “comprehensive battleﬁeld awareness.” 105 Such information,
in turn, would be used to coordinate passive defenses, facilitate
active defenses, and add precision to counterforce operations.
Given the advancing state of reconnaissance, surveillance, and
signals intelligence in the United States, as well as the advent of
networks created to integrate these systems, C4I will contribute to
the robustness of U.S. defenses. However, this gain may be offset
by factors such as the spread of sensor-evading technology, enemy
concealment activities, short launch times for ballistic missiles, and
the strain of constant alert.
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Recap.
This section has developed a picture of emerging ballistic and
cruise missile capabilities among several states, as well as the major
components of the DoD response. The picture contains several
disparities. Richer, more developed states will possess larger and
better missile forces than “rogue states,” although the latter type of
state will beneﬁt from proliferation. Moreover, the possible damage
runs across a spectrum, beginning with limited conventional strikes
with inaccurate ballistic missiles to massed strikes with a mix of
cruise and ballistic missiles armed with WMD. The picture also
contains several critical uncertainties, such as the pace of proliferation
(especially with respect to LACMs) and the effectiveness of defense.
An estimate that errs on the side of caution would assume that several
states (these being Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea,
Syria, and Libya) could maintain or gain a credible capability to
threaten U.S. bases, either within their region or across continents.
SECTION II. DETERRING AGGRESSION:
DEFENSE AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
The United States may forestall missile attacks against its overseas
bases through two basic strategies: preemption and deterrence.
As in the 2003 Iraq war, preemption is likely to be used when
U.S. leaders decide that deterrence is not a viable option. “Rogue
states” are particularly likely to be perceived by U.S. leaders as
“undeterrable.”106 Because of the enormous material, human, and
political costs inherent in any preemptive war, this course of action
will be used only when deterrence fails or is considered likely to fail.
In order to decide how best to defend U.S. bases at the strategic level,
then, we must consider the risk that adversaries will reject the U.S.
deterrent threat.
Threat of Retaliation.
During the Cold War, effective deterrence of a Soviet attack
rested on a credible threat of retaliation. In short, the U.S. leveraged
sufﬁcient military force that the costs of a strike exceeded the beneﬁts
20

of doing so, and demonstrated intent to make good on its threat.
Changes in the post-Cold War security environment produced the
need to reconsider how best to deter enemy aggression.107 Nuclear
retaliation, and even retaliation itself, was questioned as the best
method of deterring lower-level WMD and conventional attacks
by a wider array of actors. Current DoD strategy has modiﬁed the
threat of retaliation to include conventional strike alongside nuclear
strike. It also seeks to dissuade conﬂict through active and passive
defense (i.e., “deterrence by denial”) and by bolstering the defense
infrastructure, including “command and control, intelligence and
planning” capabilities. These three approaches constitute a “new
triad.”108
In the context of missile threats against U.S. military installations
overseas, defenses may help to dissuade adversaries, especially
those on the lower end of the capabilities spectrum. Defense may
also affect the underlying purpose of building such arsenals, and
thus aid in nonproliferation efforts.109 However, ﬂuctuations in the
offense-defense balance render such an assumption tenuous. The
uncertainty of defense necessitates an initial retaliatory capability
that provides adequate ﬁrepower to deter an attack. According to the
2002 Nuclear Posture Review, that capability will include both nuclear
and conventional strike options. In the ﬁrst case, the United States will
continue to sustain the traditional strategic triad composed of ICBMs,
ﬂeet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and heavy bombers.110 The
destructive capacity of strategic warheads is considerable, although
it is improbable that a U.S. leader would choose to employ such
weapons in any circumstance other than retaliation for a nuclear
strike on U.S. or allied territory. Political commitment to strategic
retaliation in the face of conventional, or even limited WMD, missile
strikes on U.S. forces overseas would probably be untenable.111
In contrast, the problem with conventional deterrence centers
on capabilities. There is little question that the United States
possesses formidable conventional weapons. The drawback is that
the ﬁrepower available under such an option would not approach
the “swift and apocalyptic consequences” associated with a nuclear
weapon.112 Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) can target the “core
assets” of a regime, including its leadership, military headquarters,
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principal ﬁghting units, etc.,113 but PGM use alone may leave a regime
intact, able to recover, and willing either to continue the ﬁght or to
negotiate a capitulation. Evasion tactics, such as those employed
by Iraqi missile forces in the Gulf War, further complicate the tasks
of establishing a credible conventional deterrent. Moreover, while
political commitment to an initial response would be virtually
assured, long-term commitment to a ground war, i.e., the only
reliable means through which to evict a regime and control territory,
is less certain. That enemy missile forces may be able to inﬂict heavy
casualties on U.S. ground troops only further complicates the chances
of long-term commitment.114 Thus, while conventional forces will
maintain a role in compelling adversary behavior in a war, their role
in deterrence is inherently limited.
Despite the limitations of each, reliance on both nuclear and
conventional strike adds the beneﬁt of ﬂexibility.115 When confronted
with limited threats against U.S. forces, a president would probably
decide to employ conventional forces, but would not have to explicitly
rule out the use of nuclear weapons. To an adversary, even a negligible
chance of nuclear war may affect the cost-beneﬁt calculation against
action. Likewise, under a severe (biological or nuclear) attack against
U.S. forces, a president may well order a nuclear strike, but would
like to retain the option of employing conventional forces. Thus an
adversary doubting the credibility of the nuclear deterrent would
still have to factor in the consequences of a non-nuclear response.
The ﬁnal component of establishing a retaliatory threat involves
effectively communicating the threat to the target state. This may occur
through several channels―formal declaratory policy, diplomatic
forums, third parties, and “signals” such as deployments, alerts,
mutual defense pacts with regional allies, and military exercises.116
Selecting the appropriate mix of communicative methods is entirely
context-dependent. Explicit warnings may adequately present the
U.S. deterrent, but those warnings might either be ambivalent,
badly worded, or offensive to the receiving state. Ambiguous
communication may force adversaries to assume that all possible
responses are still “on the table,” but may obscure U.S. intention
to follow through. “Signals” must also be selected cautiously, as a
miscalculation in the timing or nature of the demonstration could

22

fail to produce evidence of U.S. intent, or may provoke a hostile state
into using force as a supposed last resort.117 In short, the message
must be tailored on a case-by-case basis with a view of its likely
interpretation.
Coercion of Potential Aggressors.
Given the U.S. threat of retaliation, the question is whether leaders
of missile-capable states will consider using missiles against U.S.
bases in a crisis or some other situation. Cold War models of Soviet
decisionmaking posited that leaders contemplating missile strikes
against the United States would examine American capabilities and
commitment to respond to such aggression and decide whether this
course of action posed an acceptable risk or not. Since the United
States constructed and conveyed the threat of nuclear retaliation, the
prevailing notion in deterrence during the Cold War was that, as
a “rational,” “informed,” and generally predictable actor, the USSR
would not risk a war with the United States.118
Today, several conditions underlying this analysis may obtain
in some states. The ﬁrst involves strategic culture.119 Like the USSR,
states with long-standing and “coherent” deterrence theories may
view missiles as tools to be used to deter aggression, rather than as
instruments of war.120 Thus, states that recognize missiles as waravoidance mechanisms may be amenable to negotiation and making
speciﬁc “concessions” without the fear of “jeopardizing” major
security goals.121 A second factor is history. In regions in which the
United States has had a standing presence (e.g., Western Europe
and Northeast Asia) or has routinely deployed combat forces,
local antagonists may attribute a higher commitment value to U.S.
deterrent statements or signals than those in which there has been
less ﬁrst-hand experience.122 Third is regime type. Decisionmakers
backed by professional militaries and bureaucracies (such as Russia,
China, and India) are more likely to perceive correctly incoming
information and consider a full range of response options than those
that are not.123
However, missiles have proliferated to states in which such
reassuring conditions are not present. With regard to strategic
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culture, missiles in “rogue states” may be acquired as an instrument
of war, rather than as a defensive means to provide for security.
Even in China, a state that has been thought to follow a “limited
deterrence” strategy, some strands of thought consider long-range
missiles primarily as warﬁghting tools. One analyst has suggested
that China’s “ﬁrst strategic surprise attack,” should take place within
the ﬁrst day or two of a crisis.124 Historically, some new missile states
have had limited contact with the United States and might not be able
to accurately assess the U.S. commitment to respond to aggression.
Regime type also matters. In authoritarian states, decisions are more
likely to be affected by groupthink, over-optimism, and a lack of
consideration of evidence, all of which may contribute to risk-taking
behavior.125 Moreover, smaller and less well-organized regimes
are less likely to possess intelligence services that can provide an
accurate representation of enemy threats.
The importance of individual decisionmakers in authoritarian
states is also worth noting. Because of the structure of government,
leaders in such states are likely to have greater freedom in choosing
how to act in a crisis scenario. Moreover, by overstating their ability
to resist U.S. retaliation in the event of a crisis, leaders in these states
may be able to build domestic support for responses that would be
untenable elsewhere. Such leaders also tend to be risk-takers. Selfconﬁdent egoism (a key trait of the “authoritarian personality”)
“leads to both a sense of omnipotence and a feeling of invulnerability
that they cannot go wrong.”126 Certain cognitive activities may
contribute to misinterpretation of risk or ﬂawed responses. In a
denial mechanism, an individual may only accept positive evidence
for a certain choice and disregard other data. In a bolstering process,
leaders may overstate the merits of a decision and downplay the
potential repercussions.127
These factors notwithstanding, any leader interested in personal
and regime survival will have to conduct some risk calculation in
determining whether to attack U.S. forces. Moreover, the nature and
results of these assessments will vary according to circumstance―
each situation is different. The following paragraphs estimate
decisionmaking factors in states identiﬁed in Section II as potentially
capable of hitting U.S. overseas bases: Russia, China, North Korea,

24

India, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Iran, and pre-war Iraq. While these
balance sheets are quite general, we can begin to discern certain
types of situations in which the U.S. deterrent fails.
Although Russia will pose the most serious capabilities challenge
to U.S. forces, only the most imaginative scenarios would feature
a breakdown in the nuclear deterrent relationship between Russia
and the West. In the near future, NATO deployments in the Baltic
states will further close the gap between the West and the Russian
homeland. This will likely be viewed with apprehension, because of
the long history of Russian vulnerability to land invasions.128 Such
expansion may create a security dilemma in the sense of inviting a
Russian military buildup in Kaliningrad, which forms a “geostrategic
bridgehead” with the Baltic region. This is a dangerous possibility,
because Kaliningrad is severed from the main part of Russia. In a crisis,
faulty communication to Moscow could precipitate an unnecessary
escalation of tensions and ultimately produce a decision by Russia
to strike against NATO.129 Elsewhere, there is a low probability that
some conﬂict could arise between Russia and U.S. forces stationed
on its southern border, or throughout Central Asia.130
However, several factors will virtually guarantee that Russian
missiles are never employed against U.S. targets.131 First are common
interests in democracy and the prevention of war, and the common
threats of international terrorism, extremism, and the proliferation
of WMD. Second, the rising generation of Russian military ofﬁcers
seems to hold a worldview in which the collapse of the Soviet Union
is increasingly unimportant.132 Third, despite reductions in the
Russian strategic arsenal, nuclear deterrence is numerically viable
for the foreseeable future―as long as U.S. national missile defense
plans are not capable of eliminating the Russian ﬁrst strike option.133
Fourth, although questions remain to be answered about the state
of Russia’s early warning satellites,134 Russia retains intelligence
services that are “hard wired into virtually all the major capitals in
Europe,” and thus probably is able to discern NATO intentions.135
With a large and sophisticated missile inventory, China poses the
next most serious capabilities threat against U.S. forces. On one hand,
some observers believe that China is pursuing these capabilities to
constrain U.S. policy choices―not in preparation for a warﬁghting
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mission.136 Speciﬁcally, China may be pursuing a “three-tiered”
deterrent strategy, which includes a minimum nuclear deterrent
capability against the United States, a “limited, nuclear-capable
counterforce capability” at the regional level, and an offensive
conventional posture at the theater level.137 Moreover, the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) has a robust intelligence presence in the
United States, and would likely be able to gauge effectively U.S.
capabilities to stage a conventional or nuclear retaliatory strike.
Given these factors, and growing economic interdependence in the
global economy, a State Department ofﬁcial estimates that “there is
a reasonable prospect that [U.S.] deterrence would be effective.”138
On the other hand, the prolongation of an authoritarian and
nationalistic China may create situations in which international
economic or military coercion is untenable.139 In particular,
the resolution of the “Taiwan issue involves the possibility of
confrontation.”140 According to Princeton’s Thomas Christensen,
the PRC may be “fully undeterrable” in the scenario of a Taiwanese
formal declaration of independence.141 The reasons may be strategic
or political; strategic in the sense that China considers territorial
self-defense as the preeminent vital national interest;142 political in
the sense of adding legitimacy to a regime based on nationalism.143
Although China may attempt to create a fait accompli through an
initial “shock” followed by a negotiated settlement, it is likely that
the ROC would resist a Chinese incursion.144 U.S. policy toward
the defense of Taiwan is ambiguous, although a U.S. intervention
in a Straits’ crisis could lead to Chinese missile strikes against U.S.
bases throughout the Asia-Paciﬁc region. As suggested, China may
launch a “strategic strike” against U.S. forces in the opening period
of conﬂict in order to neutralize U.S. participation.
Despite its burgeoning conventional and nuclear forces, India is
unlikely to pose a major threat to the United States in the coming
decade. Several common interests will bind the United States and
India: democracy; economic growth; avoidance of an India-Pakistan
conﬂict; creation of safe border; and ﬁnding solutions to the problems
of religious extremism, drug trafﬁcking, and terrorism.145 India also
probably will not face major threats to regime stability, owing to a
strong (though factionalized) party system, and several competitive
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advantages in the global economy.146 But a possible source of tension
may be the long-term emergence of a “nationalist India”; a “highly
bellicose” state that may conceivably demand that the United
States withdraw its naval presence from the Indian Ocean and,
more speciﬁcally, its strategic base on Diego Garcia.147 Following
some unpredictable set of events, there is a nominal chance of a
confrontation, but it is far more likely that the United States will
successfully deter any Indian aggression.
Pakistan represents more of an open-ended case than either
Russia or India. In the near-term, U.S.-Pakistan relations will remain
cordial, buttressed by cooperation in the war on terrorism. To solidify
the partnership, in 2001-02 the United States granted Pakistan $1
billion in direct aid, as well as over $200 million in military sales.
Moreover, reﬂecting a history of cooperation in the Cold War, the
two nations have resumed high-level defense talks on military
cooperation and anti-terrorism matters.148 The concern is that factors
such as poor economic policy, corruption, ethnic turmoil, and the
lack of a rule of law may facilitate anti-Americanism.149 In this case,
strong U.S. ties to India may be viewed as a threat.150 Should the
United States intervene in a conﬂict in South Asia and Pakistan’s
survival is threatened, deterrence may fail.151 However, the United
States would almost certainly abstain from intervention in a fourth
Pakistan-India war.
North Korea will pose more signiﬁcant deterrence challenges
for the United States than any of the aforementioned states. The
most troublesome scenarios include an attack on the South as a
method to ensure regime stability, or a domestic conﬂict in which
government control over the military is reduced.152 On one hand, the
probability of a crisis developing is lessened by engagement―aid,
investment, personal contacts―and political pressure from Russia
and China.153 Should the regime accept engagement, the chance of a
peaceful resolution increases. On the other are factors such as food
shortages, an economy in decline, and a long-standing “strategy of
communizing the South by force.”154 In either scenario, U.S. forces
stationed in the South (or elsewhere in Northeast Asia) would be at
high risk of exposure. Indeed, reports from defectors indicate that
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may launch a
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preemptive strike on U.S. bases in the hopes that sudden mass
casualties “would lead to antiwar sentiments among U.S. citizens
and then to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.”155
Deterrence failure resulting from political instability is also a
concern for Iran. At present, Iranian security policy is dictated by
theocrats in conjunction with the military. If these elements were
destabilized by internal unrest, they may attribute the situation to
the United States―plausible because of the history of U.S. covert
action in Iran.156 As in the DPRK, a revolt may occur on account of
economic decline.157 In any other circumstance, however, an attack
on U.S. forces is less likely. Through the lens of the Gulf War, Iranian
decisionmakers have witnessed the severe consequences of a war
with the United States and the resulting sanctions.158 They must also
recognize that, since all Iranian oil exports ﬂow through a single,
vulnerable terminal in the Gulf, a confrontation with the U.S. Navy
could be “suicidal to the country’s economy.”159 Nevertheless, a
miscalculation of intentions is always possible, and the response of
the mullahs may be erratic. The most promising, but as yet uncertain,
future would involve a slow, but steady reform program and a
deepening of ties in the international system.160
Iraq is an exceptional case because U.S. deterrence arguably
failed in both the 1991 Gulf War and in the 2003 conﬂict. But the
two conﬂicts are substantively different. In the ﬁrst war, there was
a certain level of “intra-war deterrence,”161 since Hussein used
SCUD missiles against U.S. forces, but abstained from tipping those
missiles with WMD. After the Gulf War, U.S. and Israeli intelligence
agencies concluded that, if Hussein felt that his regime was on the
“brink of collapse,” he would not abstain from using unconventional
warheads against the United States.162 In 2003, the intra-war costs of
employing missiles and WMD against U.S. forces were insigniﬁcant
for the Iraqi leadership, since the United States had already stated
regime change as its objective.163 The only plausible “deterrent,” in
the sense of dissuasion at the tactical level, was against individual
Iraqi commanders and soldiers who, presumably, had more to
lose than the senior leadership.164 In the longer-term, the nature of
deterrence in a post-Hussein Iraq is unclear. A reconstituted state
may be stable or highly unstable, depending on the nature of the
United Nations (UN) effort.165
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Under the leadership of Hafez Al-Asad, the Ba’ath party in Syria
demonstrated “pragmatism” and will likely continue to do so under
his son, Bashar.166 Syria’s principal international antagonist is Israel,
although Asad would probably only choose to use force if he felt his
regime was threatened. Indeed, Syria has a major stake in the Middle
East peace process: a crisis would decrease investment, foreign aid,
and place heavy burdens on the state’s resources.167 Domestically,
the regime will likely remain intact, because the government enjoys
popular support and because the main (Islamic) opposition does not
have a signiﬁcant presence within Syria.168 But the future is uncertain,
since a number of social and economic problems are unresolved and,
as in Iran and elsewhere, demographic changes may exacerbate these
concerns.169 This could provide an opening for a transition to a more
fundamentalist regime that, in turn, could interpret the risk of Israeli
and U.S. presence in the region differently.
Further West, Libya remains the ﬁefdom of Colonel Muammar
Qadhaﬁ. Libya’s relations with the West moderated in the 1990s,
culminating in 2003 as Libya promised to halt its WMD and longerrange ballistic missile programs.170 This agreement may foreshadow
more normalized relations between Libya and the United States.
To be sure, skeptics have noted that“we should not assume that
Qadhaﬁ has changed his anti-Western” views and would not reorient
Libya’s foreign policy if the geopolitical situation was to change.171
A different problem is that, despite apparent political control,
Qadhaﬁ must contend with several potential challengers: disgruntled military ofﬁcers, pro-Islamic radicals, and nonstate
guerillas.172 Since “corruption, mismanagement, and unemployment
have eroded support for the [current] regime,”173 any of these groups
could plausibly push for a termination of Qadhaﬁ’s diplomatic
approach and reignite political-military tensions with the West.
In the context of missile strikes on U.S. bases, U.S. deterrent
capacity is reduced or eliminated in two types of situations. First,
when the core interests of a state (i.e., regime survival, territorial
integrity) are endangered. A crisis in which these interests are at risk
can result from domestic or international instability. Although the
nine states surveyed above may each contend with either or both
sources of crisis in the next decade, regime collapse is most highly
probable among the “rogue states” (Iran and North Korea; possibly
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Libya and Syria) and, to lesser degrees, Pakistan and China. In a
domestic crisis, the leadership may view missile capabilities as a
way to “divert public attention” and rally support around war with
the United States. In an international crisis, a leader may conclude
that a missile attack (perhaps including WMD) is the last, best, hope
for survival.
The second type of situation involves a calculated decision
at the beginning of an international crisis to deliver a “strategic
blow” against U.S. forces, usually with the aim of undermining U.S.
political resolve to intervene.174 Examples include Chinese strikes at
the outset of a Taiwan Straits war and a North Korean surprise attack
against U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK). In both types of
deterrence failure, the advent of new modes of ﬁghting (including
missile strikes) may themselves be important determinants of
decisionmaking in terms of altering perceptions of the balances of
forces and chances of success. However, as suggested, states will
invariably consider a much wider range of factors when assessing
the risks of breaking deterrence. For states with much to lose and
little to gain by doing so, missile capabilities may have marginal or
no effects.
Recap.
In the ﬁrst phase of the deterrence dynamic, the United States will
rely on defenses and a ﬂexible, though limited, range of nuclear and
conventional strike options. Potential aggressors, affected by factors
such as strategic culture, history, and regime type, will calculate the
risks and gains of defying the U.S. preference that force not be used.
Here, the risks will normally outweigh the beneﬁts of employing
missiles, but in certain types of situations, the reverse may be true. Of
course, the United States can take steps to increase the effectiveness
of deterrence. The mix and type of deterrent must be tailored to
individual circumstances―a nuclear, counterforce strategy may be
the best method for deterring Russia, but may be ineffective against
a smaller adversary threatening a limited conventional (or even a
chemical) strike. Moreover, U.S. decisionmakers must take stateto-state variances into account when communicating the proposed
retaliatory threat. This requires that U.S. leaders educate themselves
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on the inconsistencies and supposed “irrationalities” of their
opponents.
SECTION III. COERCION AND POLITICAL DENIAL
Enemy missiles do not need to be aimed exclusively at U.S. bases
in order to render those sites ineffective. Adversaries may attempt
to use missiles as coercive tools designed to compel or deter the
United States into withdrawing its troops prior to the beginning of
a conﬂict or opting to abstain from military intervention. The last
section pointed out that one use of missiles against bases is to create
a “strategic blow,” but such an effect may also accrue from the use or
threat of use of missiles on other overseas U.S. targets or, especially,
on the U.S. homeland. Likewise, missiles may be used to strike, or
threaten to strike, nations which host U.S. forces or provide other
access rights, thereby prompting those nations to deny the United
States the use of their territory when those usage rights are most
needed.
Threat Assertion.
As in U.S. deterrence, enemy coercive strategies begin with
the presentation of a threat deﬁned in terms of capabilities and
commitment. The capabilities must raise the cost of a foreign
policy decision so high that the target leadership opts to refrain
from choosing that course of action. Against the United States or
U.S. regional partners, missiles are attractive coercive tools for
two reasons. First, missiles can affect U.S. political decisions by
threatening, or actually creating, mass casualties abroad or (in the
case of ICBMs or ship-launched LACMs) in the homeland. The idea
is that domestic pressures to avoid or minimize losses would cause
a U.S. president to rethink whether to employ force. Second, missiles
can be leveraged against states that host U.S. troops or states that are
considering whether to grant the United States access. Host nations
may be coerced through the threat or reality of casualties and/or
economic damage.175
Global missile trends will exacerbate these utilities. Section II
pointed out that a growing number of potential U.S. adversaries are
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developing more and better missile forces. Relatively large, accurate,
lethal, and long-range missiles provide asserting states the ability
to threaten a costly military action in response to a failure of the
United States to accept its, the asserting state’s, preferences. Second,
when combined with efforts to develop WMD, world missile stocks
increasingly are able to inﬂict large numbers of military or civilian
casualties. That several states either currently possess, or are seeking
to acquire, ICBM-range ballistic missiles offers a particularly potent
capability to sway U.S. political leaders. Third, proliferation and
development will increase the number of targetable host nations
and the severity of the proposed strike. As in the second category,
concurrent production of WMD will further complicate the cohesion
of alliances and partnerships.
On one hand, the damage potential of these capabilities may be
decreased by missile defenses. Regional base protection, to reiterate,
rests on the pillars of passive and active defense, counterforce
operations, and advanced C4I. However, the effectiveness of these
defenses is uncertain. Theater missile defenses (TMD) may also
be ineffective in protecting regional allies and partners from some
enemy missile threats. National missile defense (NMD) is nearing
an initial operational capability, with interceptors already in place
at Fort Greely, Alaska.176 NMD architecture is designed to confront a
limited number of incoming ICBMs, sufﬁcient to deny any adversary
except Russia and China.177 On the other hand, missile defense at
any level will invite offensive upgrades, which may be easier to
effect than corresponding changes in deployed defenses. Moreover,
some allies have resisted acquisition of TMD out of the concern that
that would spark regional arms races.178 Finally, the actual balance
of forces may be irrelevant in a deterrent-based coercive strategy.
With reference to ICBMs, U.S. intelligence ofﬁcial Robert Walpole
has argued:
Acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass
destruction will increase the possibility that weaker countries could
deter, constrain, and harm the United States. The missiles need not be
deployed in large numbers. They need not be highly accurate or reliable;
their strategic value is derived from the threat of their use, not the near
certain outcome of such use. Some may be intended for political impact;
others may be built to perform more speciﬁc military missions―facing the
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United States with a spectrum of motivations, development timelines, and
hostile capabilities. In many ways, they are not envisioned at the outset as
operational weapons of war, but as strategic weapons of deterrence and
coercive diplomacy.179

If these weapons are intended for actual use, factors such as reliability
or accuracy would be more signiﬁcant, but even an inaccurate
ICBM strike against the U.S. homeland would have a powerful
psychological effect.
The level of commitment attached to the threat depends on
perceptions of the interests at stake, predictions of the chances of
success, and domestic political variables. First, leaders are more
likely to commit to a coercive strategy if the policy action in the
target state is interpreted to signiﬁcantly endanger the vital interests
of the regime. U.S. military intervention, or simply the presence of
U.S. troops in the region, may give rise to a view that, as long as
those forces remain, the regime’s survival is at stake.180 In such a
case, leaders may decide that a failure of the United States to accept
the opposing state’s demands warrants the use of the coercive
instrument. Interests below the level of state survival may also
create a strong will to follow through with the promise of military
action. For instance, China’s interest in the control of Taiwan may
generate domestic support for the use of China’s missile forces if the
United States opted to intervene. Nevertheless, the putative beneﬁts
of protecting interests that do not involve regime survival would
be less likely to overcome the costs of war than those that do, thus
lowering commitment.
However, leaders may still commit if the chances of success in
battle are deemed acceptably high. As noted in Section II, cultural,
historical, and regime type-related factors may cause leaders to
overestimate the effectiveness of their asymmetric warﬁghting
advantages and commit to imprudently risky decisions. This effect
may be even more skewed with respect to U.S. regional partners,
which (if unaided by the United States) lack the same level of
retaliatory capabilities. But even decisionmakers that correctly
interpret the U.S. threat of retaliation could conclude that, irrespective
of the balance of forces, the balance of willpower favors them.181
The reason is that, in the view of the asserting state, the U.S. public
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would eschew a drawn out war that did not engage vital interests.182
Asymmetries contribute to a belief in success, and thus commitment.
Still, the asserting state may also recognize that any actual attack on
U.S. sites or allies would result in an increase in target state resolve
to pursue the end-state of their regime.
Domestic political variables also have a role in conditioning the
commitment to a coercive strategy. These variables are identical to
those that affect how a state interprets the U.S. deterrent, because
both inﬂuence the risk-taking propensity of decisionmakers. For
instance, authoritarian states that do not confront any major internal
challenges would be less politically vulnerable to negative results of
using force against the United States if the coercive strategy fails, and
would be more likely to secure public support for any such effort via
control of information. The possession of a means of targeting U.S.
vulnerabilities would embolden risktakers, but in the general case of
risk avoiders may not add much or any value to commitment.
Communication is a ﬁnal component of coercion when the
strategy is to state a threat. Communications will be either direct (e.g.,
pronouncements and diplomacy) or indirect (e.g., missile tests, war
games, and public rallies). States, whose capabilities and commitment
level cannot be accurately interpreted through U.S. intelligence
means, especially closed societies with opaque decisionmaking
practices, may also seek to infuse their communication strategies with
misleading or invented claims. The most famous case of a strategic
bluff occurred in 1955, when the Soviet Air Force convinced a U.S.
military attaché that it possessed twice as many Bison heavy bombers
as it did by simply ﬂying the same bombers over the attaché’s head
again and again.183 However, the dangers inherent in this tactic
include losing credibility in future communications and sparking a
large U.S. buildup as a countermeasure.184
Coercion of the United States.
Compellent strategies against the United States would fail when
missiles are actually used against U.S. targets overseas or at home.185
Ballistic missile launches can be tracked through current U.S.
intelligence means and would allow leaders to identify the perpetrator
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and organize a response. The origins of ship-launched cruise missiles
may be harder to trace initially, but (as in the campaign against the
Taliban) any state sponsors eventually would be identiﬁed and
retaliated against. Presidents would not encounter major domestic
opposition in reacting to aggression against U.S. forces or civilians
at home. The question is not whether, but what form the response
would take. The “new triad” would allow a president ﬂexibility to
select either a conventional or nuclear strike.
Deterrent coercion requires a closer analysis of the U.S.
interpretation and response. As with U.S. deterrence of potential
aggressors, aggressor deterrence of the United States will be affected
by several domestic-level factors. In terms of strategic culture,
“mirror imaging” in the American experience has created a sense
that antagonists tend to think and act according to U.S. norms.186 For
instance, U.S. views of the nonutility of nuclear war may contribute
to the belief that others would not commit to nuclear weapons use,
when, in fact, other strategic cultures have different views on the
purposes of WMD. Some of these attitudes derived from the Cold
War. As noted, U.S. deterrence of the USSR assumed a rational
and predictable actor; such assumptions may lead U.S. leaders to
misunderstand adversary behavior.
Institutional factors will also be signiﬁcant in affecting U.S.
perceptions. With regard to intelligence, the U.S. intelligence
apparatus is professional, diversiﬁed, and technically apt.187
However, several sources of error exist: signals intelligence may be
overwhelmed by the volume and complexity of transmissions;188
human intelligence sources are, and will likely continue to be,
constrained in the extent to which they can penetrate foreign
governments and discern enemy threats; and analysis may suffer
an “institutional predisposition” to inﬂate or deﬂate estimates,
though the main examples involved a devaluation.189 Concerning
decisionmaking processes, several participating entities (DoD, the
State Department, the CIA, nongovernmental agents, etc.) will ensure
that competing opinions and data are provided. The concern is that
a president might rely on a single body or clique. This has happened
at several points in modern U.S. history, and may reoccur in a fastmoving crisis situation.190
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Although supported by these actors, presidents themselves
may inaccurately interpret the actions of missile-capable states. For
instance, presidents with a relatively benign view of a given state
may cognitively reduce the importance of missiles in a given state’s
arsenal (and, of course, the reverse is valid).191 A further concern
is that the human brain is poorly wired to deal with ambiguous
information―uncertainty often produces over-simpliﬁcation. In a
situation in which new or dissonant intelligence is received, leaders
may be confused or fall back on initial data and impressions. Finally,
the president doubtfully will be able to understand fully the behavior
of hostile actors. If U.S. leaders were “almost heroically ill-equipped”
to understand Soviet behavior, 192 understanding of new actors in the
current period is even less likely, and such ignorance could produce
faulty responses.
Affected by these factors, U.S. leaders will conduct a risk
calculation in determining whether to resist or accept coercion.
The answer goes to the question of whether states can successfully
leverage missiles to constrain the use of overseas bases in a crisis and
thus defeat the United States before war has begun. History suggests
that U.S. leaders will be least likely to accept coercive threats when
“broadly recognized national interests” are at stake.193 In cases in
which this provision has not held, the general public tends to be
casualty averse. Ohio State’s John Mueller argues that:
When the value of the stakes does not seem to be worth additional American
lives, the public has shown a willingness to abandon an overextended
or untenable position with little concern about saving face. However, if
they are not being killed, American troops can remain in peacekeeping or
nation-building ventures virtually indeﬁnitely . . .194

Elites (deﬁned here as a mix of U.S. Government, business, higher
education, and media leaders with expertise in foreign affairs) also
incorporate perceived interests into their risk assessments.195 For
instance, in 2002, 82 percent of elites say they favored intervention if
North Korea invaded the South. A bare majority (52 percent) would
support military action in a Taiwan Straits crisis, with even less
support for threats to even less obvious interests.196 Nevertheless,
despite potential public casualty aversion, a president may still reject
coercion on the basis of his/her own interpretation of the interests
at stake.
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Although a matter of perception, interests can be categorized
in a hierarchy ranging from “vital” to other, secondary concerns.197
“Vital” interests are those required to “preserve the United States as
a free nation with our fundamental values and institutions intact.”198
Lesser interests include those that are important but which do not
threaten national survival and safety. In this framework, U.S. leaders
will be more likely to risk casualties in defense of higher interests than
those that are more peripheral. Thus, the beneﬁts of safeguarding
“vital” interests would be likely to outweigh the prospective costs
of war―but the costs of casualties may outweigh the beneﬁts of
protecting lower ordered interests.
Not coincidentally, U.S. leaders are most likely to see “vital”
interests in the regions in which it is most likely to base troops:
Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. These three regions contain
the “overwhelming predominance” of global wealth; contain most
U.S. allies and a large percentage of U.S. economic interests; and
sit astride potential strategic competitors of the United States.199
Speciﬁcally, “vital” interests in East Asia have been deﬁned as
“productive” relations with China and the survival of Japan and South
Korea; in Europe, the survival of European allies and the Atlantic
Alliance; in the Middle East, the survival of Israel, access to energy,
and nonproliferation of WMD.200 Over time, U.S. decisionmakers
may also perceive “vital” interests at stake in Central Asia.201 The
United States may not, then, accept coercion to withdraw militarily
from these regions or to refuse to project power there if its “vital”
interests are endangered.
In sum, missile-based deterrent coercion may have a limited
effect on U.S. decisionmaking under certain circumstances.
Adversary capabilities and commitment would have to be perceived
so pessimistically that the estimated costs of resistance outweigh
the estimated value of doing so. The missile threat will have some
effect on a president’s ability to marshal domestic consensus for
accepting the risks of engagement, although elites, and perhaps the
general public, seem to be willing to tolerate some loss for the sake
of ensuring national interests. The level of that support, however,
is uncertain and could deteriorate if the adversary is able to ﬁnd
an effective method of communicating an unacceptable threat. But
the chance of a failure to intervene, or an ex ante withdrawal, in a
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situation in which perceived vital interests are at stake would rest on
the improbable decision of a president to pursue an option that may
be even riskier―backing down.
Political Denial.
The second major coercive utility of missiles is to divide the
United States from countries which either host U.S. forces or must
decide whether to provide temporary basing for U.S. troops in the
event of a conﬂict. In contrast to the United States, the consequences
of compellent strikes against other nations are not obvious. There
is a chance that, following an attack on a host nation, the asserting
state could plausibly assign blame to the United States and thus
cause the public to demand an ejection of U.S. forces for fear of
further reprisals. But the stakes of such a gamble are much higher
than, at least initially, coercive diplomacy, because an actual attack
would probably result in immediate retaliation. Regarding U.S.
allies, attack would be tantamount to strikes against U.S. territory
and would invite U.S. conventional or nuclear reaction. TMD may
also reduce the beneﬁts of such a strategy, while keeping the costs
constant. For these reasons, threats have more often been the subject
of analysis.202
Assessment of target state response can be divided between
allies and nonalliance “partners.”203 This distinction is based on the
premise that ally risk analyses are substantively different from those
performed by others.204 Alliance relationships are deﬁned by a formal
agreement of mutual defense; U.S. forces permanently stationed
in these states provide credibility to the obligation by serving as a
“tripwire” that, if crossed by an adversary, would automatically draw
the United States into the conﬂict.205 When deciding whether to deny
the U.S. access rights, allies must weigh the costs of jeopardizing the
defense pact against the presumed value of acceding to the coercive
threats of regional aggressors.206 Nonalliance partners, by deﬁnition,
lack a long-term security guarantee from the United States, and do
not usually host the U.S. military on a long-term basis. The risks of a
denial, then, will not include consideration of damage to a security
treaty, but may still include costs to productive political and military
relations with the United States. Despite this generalization, the risk
38

assessments will vary across major alliances (Turkey, NATO Europe,
Japan, Korea, Australia) and partnerships (especially in the Persian
Gulf and Central Asia).
The signiﬁcance of Turkey draws, in a major way, from access to
the air base at Incirlik. As noted above, missiles from Russia, Syria,
Iran, and Libya are now or will likely be able to target all or most of
Turkey, raising the possibility of coercion to deny the United States
the use of Incirlik. However, a move by any of those states to an
aggressive posture toward Turkey would almost certainly increase
the cohesion of Turkish-U.S. relations―without U.S. presence, the
same states would be in a better position to seek future concessions.207
Denial would also threaten common interests, such as prevention
of Russian inﬂuence in Central Asia, business cooperation, and
nonproliferation of WMD in the region.208 The major reasons why
Turkey would eject the United States from Incirlik stem not from
missile proliferation, but from other considerations―long-standing
fears that the United States wants to “carve up” Turkey, concern that
U.S. action may motivate Kurdish nationalists to seek independence
from Turkey,209 and the lack of public willingness to support the
basing of U.S. forces.210
U.S. access interests in European NATO include over-ﬂight
rights and forward basing of personnel and equipment (largely in
the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Italy). Europe is currently
safe from all but Chinese and Russian ICBMs, but acquisition of
IRBMs in the Middle East and North Africa would allow coercion
from several new actors. Coercion for the purpose of causing a
general U.S. withdrawal from Europe is unlikely. Despite efforts by
the European Union (EU) to develop defense capabilities separate
from NATO, Europe is still reliant on the United States as a security
provider; the transatlantic gap in military technology is widening,
and Europe lacks a strong defense industrial base. 211 Finally, some
analysts argue that the point of an independent capability is not to
create the option to reject U.S. presence, but rather to ensure that the
United States stays.”212 Proliferation would likely only underscore
Europe’s vulnerability and strengthen NATO.213
In both Turkey and Western Europe, the major concern is not
that the leadership will demand a U.S. withdrawal, but that, under
certain circumstances, the threat of missile attack will cause a political
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decision to deny the United States the use of facilities or the rights
to use airspace to transport troops to a combat zone. For instance,
during the Gulf War, Iraqi long-range missiles would have been able
to threaten mass casualties in Europe or Turkey, thus endangering the
cohesion of the alliance.214 The problem may be acute if a host nation
does not believe that its “vital” interests warrant U.S. use of force.215
However, such a decision would still have to take into account the
possible negative long-term effects on the alliance, including a U.S.
decision to withhold economic aid or, in the worst case, to reassign
its forces to a more willing host.
In East Asia, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have a substantial
presence in Japan, able to respond to a spectrum of regional crises.
Russia, China, and North Korea will be able to threaten reprisal for
Japanese basing agreements. However, Japan is unlikely to expel
U.S. forces on the grounds of growing missile threats; indeed, the
opposite is true. The reason is that Japan has fundamental concerns
about the motives of its three regional antagonists, and a signiﬁcant
reduction of U.S. presence would weaken the ability of Japan to
provide defense.216 The added beneﬁts of the defense pact include
the ability to avoid a “costly and destabilizing military buildup,”
access to U.S. technology, and symbolism of Japan’s commitment to
peace and nonaggression under civilian rule.217
Similar to NATO, the danger of reliance on forces in Japan is that
the Japanese government will deny the United States the ability to
employ those forces in a crisis. One scenario in which this may hold
true is a Chinese action against Taiwan in which the United States
seeks to utilize its Japan-based assets but, given a calculation that
the risks of a Chinese missile strike outweigh the beneﬁts of a U.S.
intervention, is denied that right. But in contrast to Europe, Japan is
likely to correlate its “vital” interests with the United States in any
instance of aggression by a regional enemy and thus permit use.
Japan is also unlikely to choose an option that threatens the longterm solvency of the alliance, owing to internal restrictions on its
self-defense forces. Nevertheless, public pressure to deny U.S. access
may be signiﬁcant in an extreme instance of coercion.
South Korea hosts a contingent of the U.S. Army, whose current
purpose is to stabilize the peninsula. As with Japan, U.S. forces serve
to balance the ambitions of other regional powers―in the case of
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Korea, China, Russia, and, possibly, a resurgent Japan.218 Speciﬁcally,
as long as the North Korean threat remains, South Koreans are not
likely to demand a U.S. withdrawal. The future beyond reuniﬁcation,
however, is less certain. In a uniﬁed, but weak, Korea, China may
be able to put sufﬁcient pressure on the new regime to scuttle the
U.S.-Korea treaty.219 Still, some liberal ROK thinkers seem to view
post-reuniﬁcation China relations as a supplement to the U.S.-Korea
alliance, rather than as an alternative.220 A separate concern is that,
with the resolution of the DPRK threat, the purpose of U.S. troops
in Korea will transition to a regional role. For instance, U.S. presence
may be more oriented toward “periodic deployments” of air and sea
assets that are, regionally, more ﬂexible than the U.S. Army.221 Given
a continuation of coercion from the PRC, Korea’s leadership may
be reluctant to allow U.S. forces to engage in operations that do not
have a direct bearing on the stability of the peninsula.222
A third East Asian alliance is Australia. Although the United
States currently has no major deployments on the continent, it
does operate a joint intelligence center, and Australia may rise in
signiﬁcance both as a training area for the United States and as a
“hedge” against the loss of access to Japan.223 The proliferation
concern is that Australia will be in range of Chinese, Russian, and
North Korean long-range missiles. However, Australia’s leaders
have expressed strong support for the presence of U.S. troops.224
The reason is that, with a relatively small population occupying a
large landmass, Australia requires an external security guarantor in
the face of ambitious regional actors.225 Commonly shared “vital”
interests between the two allies (such as nonproliferation of WMD
and free trade in Southeast Asia), also reduce the chance that missile
coercion will be effective.
Partnerships in the Persian Gulf allow the United States staging
points for military action in the Middle East. With continual U.S.
deployments in the region following 1991, relations have begun to
assume some qualities of alliance―a deterrence function against
Iran and Iraq; the “necessity” that the United States would be
immediately drawn into any act of aggression; and beneﬁts accruing
to Gulf States through extensive military-to-military contacts with
the United States.226 Such interaction boosts the credibility of the U.S.
partnership and reduces the chance of exclusion from the area.227
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However, assumptions of reliable access remain tenuous. Many
of the reasons are not related to external threats; these include the
concern that identiﬁcation with the United States in a conﬂict against
Muslims could incite domestic instability and fears that cooperation
with the United States could damage relations with other countries.228
But outside pressure is also a concern, given the relatively recent
nature of U.S. involvement in the region and the lack of a mutual
defense treaty. For instance, partly due to the fear of retribution
from Saddam Hussein, all Gulf States except Kuwait denied the
United States use of facilities during strikes on Iraq in 1998.229
Missile proliferation in states such as Iran and Syria compounds the
concern that the same states will hedge against granting the United
States access in any crisis short of an actual military action against
them.
As indicted by deployments during the campaign against
Afghanistan in 2001-02, Central Asia may assume a greater role in the
temporary basing of U.S. forces in the next decade. Regional powers
such as China, Iran, and Russia would be skeptical of U.S. motives
and may seek to leverage arms to retain inﬂuence.230 In general, U.S.
access to the region will be difﬁcult in any case in which local states
and regional powers do associate their own interests. The reason is
that, in the absence of solid commitments by the United States to act
as a guardian of the potential host states’ security, those states will
either turn to other powers as guarantors or will be easily coercible
by the threat of force.231 Iranian, Russian, or Chinese missiles may
be an exceptionally powerful means to extract favorable political
decisions in this region. However, should the United States ﬁnd a
way to convince Central Asian states that U.S. partnership―even if
it does not constitute an alliance―is the best way to avoid Russian or
Chinese “imperialist ambitions,” the chances of access improve.232
In sum, the use of missiles as political tools may affect the ability
of the United States to ensure political access to both allied states and
those with which it does not have a formal security treaty. Among
allies, there is a minimal chance that the U.S. military will be asked
to leave on account of foreign threats, but rights to use facilities
or airspace may be withheld in cases in which the ally does not
directly link its interests with the United States. Improvements in
the capabilities of adversary coercive instruments may make such
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denials more frequent. Reliability of access to partner state territory
is problematic because the security beneﬁts of granting access are
less clearly deﬁned than in the case of an alliance. Unless the United
States can convince its partners that it intends to provide protection
against foreign threats, adversaries will be in a strong position to
demand that those states refuse to give the United States sanctuary.
Recap.
Missile development and acquisition will lead to capabilities to
coerce, while commitment to such a strategy may be strong when
the asserting state’s security goals are at risk. U.S. response to
compellance would be immediate retaliation, and the United States
is unlikely to accept deterrent coercion when a case can be made
that “vital” interests would otherwise be sacriﬁced. The responses of
host nations will be disparate and unpredictable when their interests
are not threatened. But, as U.S. General John Jumper concludes,
“Access is an issue until you begin to involve the vital interests of
the nation that you want and need as a host. Then access is rarely
an issue.”233 Nevertheless, given the growing lethality of adversary
strike capabilities (as well as various domestic political factors not
reviewed here), questions remain about the reliability of host nations.
The United States must assume that its allies could be induced into
denying the rights to use their territory during a crisis in which its,
the allies’, core interests are not directly and explicitly at risk.
SECTION IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Missile threats will pose new and complex risks to overseas
basing reliability on three levels, although that impact is obscured
by several disparities and uncertainties. At an operational level,
several new actors are acquiring, fairly rapidly, the means to target
effectively and destroy ﬁxed land locations, such as ports, command
centers, logistics facilities, and air bases. Actors, old and new, are
also ﬁnding ways to improve the quality of their missile forces visà-vis U.S. defenses. Across a broad capabilities spectrum, potential
aggressors will be able to threaten the United States in each of the
major theaters in which it is likely to operate in the next decade
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(Europe, East Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia). To be sure,
U.S. defenses will reduce the potential damage, but the extent of that
protection, especially against massed volleys of accurate cruise and
ballistic missiles, is uncertain.
At the strategic level, the United States will seek to deter its
adversaries from employing force by threatening, at varying degrees
of credibility, a nuclear or conventional response. The hope is that
any state weighing the costs and beneﬁts of such an action will
choose against it, but international or domestic instability in one or
more of these missile-capable states could lead to situations in which
one might view preemptive strike as an optimal choice. This is a
particular concern when a regime is on the verge of a collapse, or if a
leader is convinced that a decisive victory can be achieved through a
surprise attack on U.S. forces. More discretely, intra-war deterrence,
in terms of preventing escalation to the use of WMD during a conﬂict,
may also be threatened when the costs of such actions are very low,
especially in the late phases of regime collapse.
U.S. forces deployed or deploying overseas are also at risk of
missile coercion directed against U.S. leaders and political decisions
in host nations in order to compel denial of access. Missiles are
exceptionally powerful coercive tools because they are able to inﬂict
large amounts of damage against military sites or population centers
in small periods of time. Acquisition and improvements to missile
arsenals only compound the problem. Responses will vary based on
the consequences of accepting or rejecting coercion; target states will
probably reject coercion when their vital interests are threatened, yet
even then it is difﬁcult to assume reliable access.
Geographical disparity adds one layer of variance. Bases further
away from the source of conﬂict are typically less vulnerable than
those within closer range. SRBMs and most LACMs cannot hit
targets beyond several hundred kilometers, even though midrange ballistic missile proliferation and advances to cruise missiles
will permit adversaries to strike over longer distances. Still, those
weapons are more expensive than their short-range counterparts,
are fewer in number, take longer to travel, and are thus somewhat
easier to intercept. Rear area bases are also likely to have stronger
and more effective infrastructure to limit damage. In addition, such
bases are likely to be situated in territories or countries that have
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solid relations with the United States. Bases on Diego Garcia, Guam,
and in the United Kingdom are not likely to be seriously threatened
in a political sense. Close-in bases, such as those in Japan or Kuwait,
may also be insulated from coercion. In addition, forward bases may
have more effective defenses than those areas for which the day-today threat level is considered much lower.
Reliability will also vary on a regional basis. Western Europe is
relatively secure because of Article V NATO guarantees, the distance
to most potential enemies, stable transatlantic ties, and continuing
strategic dependency.234 Yet access is still uncertain when perceived
security interests are not threatened. Central Asia is situated between
two latent aggressors (Russia and China), and a lack of formal security
guarantees could pose difﬁculties for U.S. access. A breakdown of
deterrence in this region does not seem likely, but a prolonged U.S.
military presence itself could produce attempts at coercion or, in a
worst-case, open hostilities. East Asian allies are close to possible
sources of conﬂict and thus have an incentive to retain U.S. forces,
but are also in range of unstable regimes and states that may have
both the capabilities and will to pursue coercive strategies. Troops in
Japan and the ROK, and to a lesser extent Australia, may be at risk of
attack or denial, although that risk will be reduced by alliances and
robust defenses. Middle East states have been increasingly willing
to host U.S. forces, as relations assume qualities of alliance, and as
the capabilities of local antagonists increase. Yet basing is tenuous
there because of the lack of formal guarantees, and because of the
proximity to potentially unstable or hostile regimes (including Iran,
Iraq, Syria, and Libya).235
Similarly, vulnerability will differ at the country level. Part of
the variance is due to geography, as described above. Some host
nations are simply much closer to missile-equipped aggressors than
others. Moreover, individual states have differing histories and
relationships with the United States, decisionmaking processes,
cultures, and domestic politics, each of which will affect how those
states behave under conditions of high risk. The generalization that
allies are reliable hosts may not always apply. While not a product
of coercion, Turkey’s decision to deny U.S. forces access in the 2003
Iraq war is an example of the questionable dependability of allies.236
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Nonallied states lack formal security guarantees from the United
States, but may still be reliable hosts when their perceived interests
demand such a course of action. That several Gulf States provided
U.S. access rights in 2003 when Turkey did not provides evidence
against the rule that nonallies are less dependable than allies.
Linked to regional and country differences, the nature of U.S.
basing agreements adds another layer of complexity to the impact.
Permanent bases bolster deterrence by serving as a “tripwire” and
solidifying U.S. alliances, but, due to their long-term function, may
create a security dilemma. This is a particular problem in East Asia,
in which U.S. forces permanently deployed in Japan and South Korea
may be seen as threatening to the security of China and North Korea.
NATO bases in the Baltic region or, less plausibly, in the Caucasus,
may similarly provoke Russia.
Temporary bases pose a separate set of concerns. When used
for certain purposes, such as performing humanitarian missions or
eliminating a common adversary, short-term bases may not have
any negative consequences at the strategic level. However, when
such locations serve (or are seen) as staging grounds for military
action against a missile-capable state, they may invite preemption
or coercion. Yet unlike permanent bases, these facilities may lack
signiﬁcant infrastructure to protect high-value assets.
Uncertainties, even in a modest effort to project 10 years into the
future, further obscure the impact. This is, in part, due to research
limitations on this assessment, but uncertainty is also an integral
and unavoidable problem of making estimates. Questions remain
about exactly how far proliferation will proceed, especially in terms
of cruise missile acquisition and dual-use technologies that may add
value to the missile arsenals of even “rogue states.” The efﬁcacy of
deterrence is hard to judge because the decisionmaking of closed
societies is unclear and because states that appear strong today could
destabilize with little warning. Assessments of the coercive utility of
missiles also depend on ambiguous capabilities and obscure enemy
risk calculations. Moreover, as already noted, U.S. and partner state
decisions may not always conform to the rule that coercion will be
rejected when signiﬁcant interests are at stake; the deﬁnition and
perception of “vital” interests itself is liable to vary over time.
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Policy Implications.
The United States can hedge against risks at all three levels
through several methods, while continuing to place some reliance on
overseas basing. These include: ﬁnding effective routes to deterrence
while retaining the option of shifting to a preemptive strategy;
strengthening alliances and partnerships; reducing over-reliance on
any single base through dispersion and moving critical assets to the
rear area; building effective counterattack forces; and developing
advanced active and passive defenses.
Deterrence will remain the principal strategy through which the
United States seeks to defend both its homeland and its overseas
interests from attack. Deterrence is most likely to fail when adversary
leaders calculate that a ﬁrst strike will fulﬁll major security objectives
and during periods of regime collapse. Avoidance of the ﬁrst type of
breakdown may be achieved through state-by-state adjustments to
the threat the United States promises if its interests come under attack.
U.S. targeting policies must account for assets valued most highly
by the receiving state; these will vary from country to country. U.S.
leaders must also ﬁnd methods of communicating the threat that will
be most effective given different cultures, decisionmaking processes,
and other domestic level variables. For instance, declaratory policy
that WMD use will result in forced regime change may be effective
against some states.
Regarding the second type of breakdown (states on the brink of
collapse), the United States may not be able to propose any cost that
outweighs the target state’s estimated beneﬁts of missile use. If there
is clear and compelling evidence that deterrence failure is imminent,
the only available option for U.S. leaders may be a preemptive
strike. Discrete planning for such an eventuality must, of course,
begin well in advance of the actual operation―this requires that
the United States reliably identify and track enemy missile forces,
WMD facilities, command and control infrastructure, etc., so that the
risk of a retaliation is mitigated. If the United States cannot do so, a
preemptive strike may well “trigger the very attack it was intended
to prevent.”237 In another sense, the United States must maintain
adequate long-range offensive strike forces to perform such missions
(details on this criterion are discussed in the section on counterattack
below).
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Second, relations with current or potential host nations can
be strengthened. At the policy level, the United States can offer
security guarantees to countries that are not currently allies. For
domestic political reasons, this need not be a public activity, but
frank and carefully worded messages to partner leaderships may
have some effect in sustaining cooperation. Peacetime military-tomilitary contact, in the form of training and exchanges, is also useful
in informing host nations of the capabilities and will of the U.S.
Government.238 Another type of initiative, which may or may not
best be handled publicly, involves civil defense. U.S. shared expertise
(to the extent that it exists) in how to manage a crisis may enhance
the conﬁdence of leaders in times of risk, thereby increasing the
probability that coercion will be rejected.239 Finally, missile defenses
offer a means of reassuring allies, but allies may have technical,
economic, and strategic concerns about cooperation in this area.
Decisions to deploy TMD in foreign territory ought to be made in
the context of consistent dialogue with the relevant governments.240
Third, force structure changes can reduce over-reliance on any
single base. Dispersing assets to numerous locations in a theater―
as opposed to consolidating those assets in one, or very few sites―
would place a higher burden on any attacker seeking to deal a
decisive blow. Dispersal to many host nations would also minimize
the effects of any given denial. However, this tactic would entail
relatively high infrastructure development and personnel costs.241
A possible way to achieve dispersion without accruing these added
costs would be to negotiate options to deploy to pre-existing sites
during wartime (known as securing “places without bases”). An
example is the Changi Naval Base in Singapore, which is a “place”
to which U.S. carriers can deploy without actually maintaining
a permanent “base,” and which provides insurance against a loss
of carrier basing in Japan. A variation would involve moving prepositioned and high-value equipment from vulnerable forward bases
to power projection “hubs” in the rear area, including Guam, Diego
Garcia, or in the UK.242 Once the missile threat has been neutralized,
material at these sites could be lifted to close-in bases.
The fourth approach to reducing risk involves counterattack. A
capability to locate and destroy enemy missile forces before they are
employed is an integral part of strategies of preemption and would also
48

contribute to deterrence and nonproliferation. Counterattack places
speciﬁc burdens on the Navy and Air Force to develop precision, deep
strike forces, including long-range bombers and cruise missiles. The
current Air Force concept for achieving this type of capability is the
Global Strike Task Force (GSTF). GSTF is centered on early insertion
of B-2 bombers equipped with conventional bombs, supported by
F-22 escorts and advanced ISR to identify enemy ﬁxed and mobile
targets.243 However, the active B-2 ﬂeet stands at only 16, with no
new stealthy bombers on the acquisition agenda―this is probably
not sufﬁcient to achieve the GSTF’s goal.244 The B-2 production
line may have to be reopened to achieve a plausible counterattack
capability, notably against states with higher end capabilities.245
Regarding the Navy, part of the Trident SSBN ﬂeet may transition
to a role in delivering conventional cruise missiles. Plans to rechristen these ballistic missile submarines as SSGNs are underway,
and may complement the GSTF program well.246 However, enemy
concealment activities will continue to pose signiﬁcant problems for
the development of effective counterattack.247
Active and passive defenses compose a ﬁnal way to decrease
vulnerability. The TMD programs currently under development
were discussed in Section II; such efforts, even if realized, might
not be able to engage reliably incoming ballistic or cruise missiles.
However, longer-term, advanced concepts may offer more complete
and reliable protection for theater bases. Space-based directed energy
weapons, able to kill ballistic missiles in their boost phase, have been
cited as one potentially transformational approach to ballistic missile
defense.248 Regarding cruise missiles, the Space-Based Radar and
long-range, unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles could provide
signiﬁcantly better tracking data. Passive defenses have suffered
from the drawbacks of time and cost. However, RAND has proposed
a new approach to infrastructure development, called “ﬂex-basing,”
which may mitigate these concerns. The idea is that defensive
materials can be pre-positioned at power-projection “hubs” around
the world, and rapidly transferred to forward locations in times
when those resources are most needed.249 Sustained research, testing,
and evaluation are obviously necessary if these types of concepts are
ever to come to fruition.
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*****
These ﬁve types of risk reduction approaches are logical
responses to the missile threat as interpreted in this monograph. In
combination, they will increase the reliability of overseas bases over
the course of the next decade. No combination, however, will be able
to eliminate the risks that accrue from enemy missile acquisition and
development, not to mention other types of threats not considered
here (terrorism, guerrilla attacks, political denial not resulting from
external threats, etc.). The residual risk is a cost of the pursuit of
global engagement, and it will fall to future leaders to decide whether
that cost is worth the beneﬁt of continuing to be militarily engaged
overseas.
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